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WILLS-LOST WILLS-METHODS

OF PROOF-COMPETENCY

OF

WITNESSES-Eder vs. The Methodist Church Association-No.
12770-Decided January 15, 1934-Opinion by Mr. Justice
Hilliard.
Eder died in 1928 and thereafter one Fox was appointed administrator. Thereafter petition was filed seeking admission to probate
as a lost will a carbon copy of such purported lost will. The copy was
admitted to probate as a lost will.
1. Where a caveat to a will is filed the statute contemplates the
filing of the answer of the caveat, and even where the parties without
objection proceed to trial on the theory that the allegations of the caveat
were to be taken as denied, such practice is not commended.
2. The burden of proof is upon the proponents to establish facts
to admit the will but upon the caveat the burden is upon the objectors.
3.
The fact that a witness is attorney for the proponents does
not disqualify him as a witness by the fact that he would be entitled to
fees for his services in a will contest. A beneficiary under the will is an
incompetent witness. The administrator and proponents of the will
being parties to the proceedings and directly interested in the event
thereof, are incompetent witnesses. Where a church is beneficiary under
a will a member of the church is not disqualified as a witness. The true
test of the interest of a witness is that he will either gain or lose by
the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment.
4. A will, once validly made and published, remains a will although the writing, the best evidence of it, in the absence of intent to
revoke, be lost or destroyed.
5. The declarations of a testator subsequent to the making of
a will with reference to the existence thereof are admissible.-Judgment
reversed.
EJECTMENT-QUIET TITLE-PLEADINGS-CONDEMNATION-MacKenzie vs. Corley-No. 12981-Decided January 15, 1934Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
MacKenzie sought to quiet title to 100-foot strip of land formerly
used for railroad right of way. In 1900 the strip of land was condemned for railroad purposes for right of way and damages paid to the
then owner. The land was used for railroad purposes until 1922
when the railroad property was sold by a receiver to Corley. The
railroad later dismantled and the right of way of the railroad converted into a toll road.
The plaintiff claims that this was a change in the granted use
and that plaintiff had a reversionary interest in the land. Defendant
alleged ownership and possession by virtue of deed from receiver and a
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right to use it for toll road by virtue of a permit from the United States,
and that the plaintiff purchased the land with full knowledge and made
no objection to expenditure for conversion to a toll road.
Plaintiff's demurrer to the answer was overruled and plaintiff replied denying that the construction, operating and maintaining of the
toll road was with his consent or with the consent of his predecessor.
General demurrer to the reply was sustained and on plaintiff's refusal
to plead further, order of dismissal was entered.
1. While the parties below treated this as an action in ejectment, the pleadings disclose it to be an action to quiet title.
2. While the complaint on its face was insufficient as a complaint to quiet title for lack of necessary allegation of possession, however, the answer alleged ownership and possession and prayed that the
rights of the defendant be determined. This answer gave the Court
equity jurisdiction to determine the controversy and when the plaintiff
filed his reply alleging ownership and right to possession an issue was
made.
3. The answer disclosed a substantial defense if proven.
4. If the plaintiff knew that the defendant waschanging the
use of the right of way from railroad uses to that of a toll road and
allowed the defendant without objection to make expenditures in construction of the toll road he is estopped from maintaining either trespass or ejectment for the entry of such changed use and is restricted to a
suit for damages. In law he is regarded as having acquiesced in such
action on the part of the defendant and his grantee, the plaintiff herein,
taking title with the same notice is also estopped from maintaining an
action in ejectment or trespass and cannot recover damages for the occupation thereof.
5.
The right to recover damages belongs to the original owner
alone and did not pass with the land to his grantee.
6. These allegations formed an issue and required proof and
the Court was in error in sustaining defendant's demurrer to plaintiff's
replication and dismissing the complaint.-Judgment reversed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-ATTORNEY

AS

EMPLOYEE

WITHIN

ACT-Industrial Commission of Colorado vs. Moynihan-No.
13353-Decided January 22, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice
Hilliard.
Moynihan, an attorney, residing at Montrose, Colorado, was employed by the Oliver Power Co., a public utility corporation, under
retainer and subject to its call for services at any time and while so
employed came to Denver, Colorado, on its behalf, and while returning home was injured in an automobile accident. Moynihan prevailed

in the Court below and the Court below ordered the Commission to
determine the extent of disability and fix compensation.
1. Section 4383 Compiled Laws 1921 as amended Session Laws
1931, page 819, does not exclude members of the legal profession: he
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is, otherwise, within the statute for the enjoyment of its protecting
purpose.
2.
Where a lawyer is especially employed in particular instances
the circumstances may be such as to make him an independent contractor, and, therefore, not entitled to relief by virtue of compensation
legislation.
3.
However, where an attorney, by the terms of his employment,
gives his time and services subject to the call of his employer and is
regularly employed by that client, his employment is not casual, neither
i's he an independent contractor but is an employee within the terms
of the compensation act.--Judgment affirmed.
MANDAMUS-TRANSFER OF SHARES IN CORPORATION-Hertz DrivUrself-System, Inc., et al. vs. Doak-No. 13446-Decided January 22, 1934-Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Adams.
Doak brought mandamus to compel the transfer to him of 625
shares of capital stock of defendant corporation. Mandamus was
awarded below.
1. A defendant in a mandamus action cannot defeat same by
filing an answer alleging that the ownership of the stock is in dispute
and offering no proof in support of the answer.
2. Defendant cannot oust the jurisdiction of the Court in the
mandamus proceedings by simply raising issue of ownership.
3.
The duty of corporate officials to issue stock certificates to
those entitled thereto is a ministerial duty enforceable by mandamus.
4. Mandamus is a discretionary writ and the order is reversible
for abuse of discretion, but there was no such abuse of discretion in
granting the writ in the present action.
5.
No one is entitled to the writ of mandamus whose right is
not clear and unquestionable and it is not a proper remedy when it is
apparent that the interests of third parties who are not before the Court
are involved, but it is always a proper remedy to procure a transfer of
corporate stock when the facts justify it.
6. A sham answer followed by no proof in support of it cannot
operate as a stalemate to check the petitioner in his rightful demand
for the transfer of stock to which he is entitled on the books of the
corporation.--Judgmentaffirmed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-DISTINCTION BETWEEN PUBLIC EMPLOYER AND PRIVATE EMPLOYER-PUBLIC EMPLOYEE-The
Industrial Commission vs. The State Compensation Insurance
Fund et al.-No. 13408-Decided January 22, 1934--Opinion
by Mr. Justice Holland.
Susman was allowed compensation for injury incurred in accident arising out of and in course of his employment. The employer, a
mining company, was the lessee of minerals in school lease made by
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State Board of Land Commissioners. The award of Industrial Commission was set aside by the District Court and error prosecuted therefrom.
1. In order that an injured workman can fix liability in a public
employer, he must first be in such employment as a public employee.
2. When such workmen is working for a private mining company which is lessee of minerals from the Board of Land Commissioners, he is not a public employee but a private employee and is not
entitled to compensatioa.--Judgment affirmed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION-SUFFICIENCY OF PLEADINGS-STATUTORY LIMITATIONS ON COMMISSION-NECESSITY OF FINDINGS

-- Sherratt et al. vs. The Rocky Mountain Fuel Co. et al.No. 13424-Decided January 29, 1934-Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Defendants in error were plaintiffs in the trial Court where they
sought to set aside an award of the Industrial Commission and to
review an adverse judgment; the claimant and the commission prosecute
this writ. The judgment of the District Court was to the effect that
the commission acted without and in excess of its powers in making
its award of June 29, 1933, and its affirmation of same on July 10,
1933, and vacated said award and remanded the case to the commission with directions to deny further compensation. This judgment, on
a petition for rehearing, was modified and the case remanded to the
commission for further hearing and proceeding in conformity to the
former ruling of the Court.
1. From the face of the record, the award of April 9, 1931,
was not subject to review other than, and only, upon the commission's own motion. That procedure is prescribed and limited by the
statute. Any supplemental award that would change, alter or modify
the effect of the.award of April 9, 1931, by which the claimant was
found to have fully recovered from his injury, would require a specific
findings as to a change in this recovered condition.
2. The Industrial Commission cannot after it has made an
award to the effect that the claimant had made a complete recovery,
make subsequent awards on the ground that it had overlooked the
original award of April 9, 193 1, and vacate the subsequent awards and
make an award of resumption of payments which still leave the original
award of April 9, 1931, containing a specific findings of complete
recovery.
3. The Industrial Commission wholly failed to follow the statute and if it attempted to disregard the express requirement of the
statute, then it acted without auhority. It did not find that there was
any error or mistake in the award of April 9, 1931, which contained
the specific findings of complete recovery. It did not find that there
had been a changed condition since the date of that award.
4. Authority to award a fixed aggregate amount of compensation
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must come from a finding, in the award, of permanent disability.Judgment affirmed.
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS ON INTERROGATORIES FROM THE SENATEIMPORTANCE OF QUESTION-In re Interrogatories of the Senate
Concerning the Constitutionality of House Bill No. 45-No.
13463-Decided January 29, 1934--Opinion en Banc.
The senate of the 29th general assembly by resolution submitted
to this Court certain interrogatories concerning the constitutionality of
a portion of house bill No. 45.
1. Under Section 3 of Article 6 of the Constitution the Supreme
Court is required to give its opinion upon pending legislation only
upon important questions upon solemn occasions when required by
* * *, the Senate, * * *."
2. Extraordinary sessions of the general assembly can only be
convened by proclamation of the Governor and the business transacted
therein is limited to that named in the proclamation.
3.
A bill entitled "An act to provide revenue for the relief of the
unemployed, destitute and suffering," but which in its body provides
for the regulation of the manufacture, sale and use of malt, vinous and
spirituous liquors and merely provides for relief of the unemployed and
destitute by virtue of a small amount of the revenue raised from the
liquor control into the Old Age Pension Fund and setting aside another
small amount for the use of the Colorado State Relief Committee, is
not within the Governor's proclamation and could under no circumstances be valid if passed by the present extraordinary session.
4.
A bill whose chief purpose is other than the raising of revenue
does not become a revenue measure merely because some of its provisions produce revenue.
5.
The legislature cannot go beyond the limits of the business
"specifically named in the proclamation" of the Governor at an extraordinary session.
INTERVENTION-PARTNERSHIP DISSOLUTION-RIGHT OF DIVORCED
WIFE OF ONE PARTNER TO INTERVENE--Stokes vs. Dollard et

al.-No. 13378-Decided January 29, 1934--Opinion by Mr.
Justice Burke..
Dollard sued Stokes for dissolution of partnership. Mrs. Stokes
filed petition in intervention. Dollard demurred and demurrer sustained.
Mrs. Stokes stood on demurrer and moved for stay of execution. This
was denied. Dollard had judgment in the main case and Mrs. Stokes
brings error.
I. Mrs. Stokes, the intervenor, had a right to stand on her petition when the general demurrer thereto was sustained. She had no
duty to amend or move for leave. That ruling was, as to her, a final

judgment.
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2. That judgment being final Mrs. Stokes was entitled to a stay
of execution.
3. One who has an interest in the subject matter of the litigation, or in the success of either party, may intervene.
4. A deserted wife whose absconding husband has no property
save what is tied up in a partnership may intervene in dissolution of
her husband's partnership for the purpose of impounding whatever
interest her husband may be decreed to have therein for the support of
herself and minor children, and is not required to wait before intervening for a final determination of her divorce action.-Judgment reversed.
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION--SUFFICIENCY OF COMMISSION'S FINDING ON CONFLICTING EVIDENCE-The Hayden Brothers Coal

Corporation et al. vs. The Industrial Commission et al.-No.
13425-Decided January 29, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice
Holland.
This is an action to review a judgment of the District Court in
affirming a supplemental award for additional compensation made by
the commission upon a review had on its own motion.
1. Where the record discloses a conflict in the evidence before the
commission this Court will not pass upon the weight of the evidence
in a workmen's compensation case. This is exclusively for the determination of the Industrial Commission.
2. Where there is a conflict of evidence and there is competent
evidence to support the findings of fact made by the commission the
findings so made are final.-Judgment affrmed.

FIRE INSURANCE-SUFFICIENCY OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIALFAILURE TO FILE PROOF OF Loss-Home Insurance Company

vs. Taylor-No. 13111--Decided February 5, 1934--Opinion
by Mr. Justice Campbell.
Taylor and others recovered judgment below on fire insurance
policy.
1. Where motion for new trial and assignment of error are
merely to the effect that the trial court erred in not finding the issues
joined in favor of the defendant and against the plaintiff, they are
insufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to entertain
a writ of error.
2. Where the insured fails to file proof of loss within time required by the policy, but the insurance company refused to pay the
loss in any event, it waived compliance with the policy requiring notice
of proof of loss.--Judgment affirmed.
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PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS-DENTISTS-MEASURE OF LIABILITY-

Brown vs. Hughes-No. 13176-Decided February 5, 1934Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Mrs. Hughes recovered judgment in court below against Brown,
a dentist, and against Desmond, a physician and surgeon, for $5,000
damages for death of her husband alleged to have been caused by their
joint and several negligence in pulling 16 teeth and removing his tonsils
at the same operation, at a time when he was in bad health. Among
many assignments of error, the controlling one is that the evidence was

insufficient to justify a verdict.
1. The facts in this case are insufficient to justify a verdict against
the dentist and physician.
2. All that the physician and dentist in this case were required
to render in the way of service, in the diagnosis and treatment of their
patient, was such a degree of skill and care as is ordinarily possessed
by those in the practice of their profession under similar conditions
of the patient and in their particular locality.
3. The defendants here must first have left and entirely abandoned all knowledge acquired in the fields of exploration and adopted
some rash or experimental methods before liability would ensue and
the evidence -wholly fails to evince any want of skill or a reckless
disregard of consequences.--4udgment reversed.

CONSISTENCY - MODIFICATION - Mystic Tailoring
Company vs. Jacobstein, Admx.-No. 13465-Decided February
5, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Adams.
Bertha Jacobstein, as administratrix of her deceased husband's
estate, recovered judgment below for $150.00, for services rendered by
her husband during his lifetime. The company assigns error and the
administratrix assigns cross-error. The deceased was employed by the
company at a salary of $100 per week and for a period of three weeks
was paid no salary. The only defense was that the deceased, being
an officer and stockholder, voluntarily agreed to waive his salary, which
was denied. Counsel for the company argue that the judgment for
$150.00 cannot be reconciled with the evidence and that the judgment
should be for nothing or for $300.00. Counsel for the administratrix
confesses the rule but argues that it was error not to enter judgment
for the full $300.00.
1. A verdict or judgment must be consistent with some legitimate theory of the testimony, and where it is not, should be set aside.
2. In this case, the judgment should have been for $300.00 and
it accordingly is so increased to correspond with the undisputed facts.
-- Judgment modified and affirmed,

JUDGMENTS -
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WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION; ACCIDENT-PROXIMATE CAUSE-Peer

vs. Industrial Commission of Colorado-No. 13441-Decided
February 5, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Adams.
Claimant was employed as dishwasher in restaurant and had been
for years and was accustomed to use a metal instrument like a putty
knife to scrape pans and one night while using this scraper, noticed
soreness in palm of hand which later developed into osteomyelitis of the
wrist bone, caused by infection. There was no abrasion of the skin of
the hand or any cut or evidence externally to show how the infection
started. The Commission denied an award which was affirmed by
the District Court.
1. An accident, under the Workmen's Compensation act, must
be traceable to a definite source.
2. The burden of proof is upon claimant to show that her injury was the proximate result of an accident arising out of and in the
course of her employment.
3. The record fails to show that claimant was bruised or injured by the scraper, or what the cause of the injury actually was. It
does not appear that it was in any way attributable to or connected
with her employment.--Judgment affirmed.
WILLS--JOINT TENANCY-Kwatkowski vs. Reindt-No. 13440Decided February 5, 1934--Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
Under the last will and testament of Kwatkowski he bequeathed
to Herbert E. Canfield and Mary E. Canfield, jointly and severally,
all of his property. Herbert E. Canfield pre-deceased the testator. Testator left no known heirs. The state of Colorado, claiming this was an
estate in common and not a joint tenancy, asserted in the court below
that the proceeds of one-half of the estate must be paid to the state of
Colorado. The court below held it to be a joint tenancy and the state
of Colorado prosecuted error.
1. The laws of Colorado expressly favor tenancies in common
as against joint tenancies.
2. No estate in joint tenancy can be created unless the instrument of conveyance expressly declares that the title shall pass, not in
tenancy in common but in joint tenancy.
3. The terms in a will that two persons shall take, "Jointly and
severally" does not constitute a joint tenancy.-Judgment reversed.
PARTNERSHIP-WHAT

CONSTITUTES-Fisher

vs. Colorado Central

Power Co.-No. 13091-Decided February 5, 1934--Opinion
by Mr. Justice Burke.
The Colorado Central Power Co. sued Fisher and Stack as copartners doing business as the Acme Sand & Gravel Co., for approximately $900.00 due on open account for electric power furnished for
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the operation of a gravel pit. Fisher denied that he was a partner. The
cause was tried to the Court and the Power Company had judgment.
1. The Acme Sand & Gravel Co. being an unincorporated association the owners thereof were partners.
2. Neither a specific intent nor a written contract to form a copartnership are essential to its creation.
3.
As to persons who had dealt with a partnership or to whom
it was indebted the responsibility of a partner, in the absence of. notice
of his withdrawal, is clearly settled.
4. The statute requires that a partnership using a trade name
shall file with the County Clerk and Recorder an affidavit setting forth,
among other things, the names and addresses of its members.
5.
Fisher was in personal charge of the finances of the Acme Sand
& Gravel Co. and his office was its office, he received its money and bills
of this particular creditor against it were sent to him there and paid there
by his employee without protest and sometimes by checks of a corporation which he owned or controlled, and he owned the land on
which the gravel pit was operated.--Judgmentaffirmed.
TAXATION-UNIFORMITY OF ASSESSMENT--Colorado Tax Commission vs. ColoradoCentral Power Co.-No. 12949-Decided February 5, 1934-Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
This action was commenced in the District Court in Jefferson
County by the Colorado Central Power Co. under C. L. 1921, Section
7287. It seeks to set aside the assessment of the company's property
heretofore made for the year 1929 by the Colorado Tax Commission
on the principal ground that the assessment was illegal and not uniform with the assessment made against other like parties. The Court
below reduced the Commission's assessmenxt of $863,100.00 to $569,460.00.
1. A motion has been filed in this Court to dismiss the proceedings in error, the ground being that the judgment of the Court below
is not subject to review. The motion is denied.
2. A judgment of the District Court even in a purely statutory
proceeding will be deemed to fall within the general provision for review by this Court where no contrary intention is expressed.
3.
The record fails to sustain the charge that the assessment was
illegal. Where the evidence shows a substantial difference between the
many assessed corporations that exactly similar computations are impracticable and incapable of accomplishing a fair and proportionate assessment the same and identical plan is not required to be applied to
each one. All taxpaying properties of this character must necessarily
be considered from many angles. No single method can be applied to all.
4. The description in C. L. 21, paragraphs 7343-7345 reveal a
plain legislative purpose to place an effective screen of secrecy around the
information elicited from public utility corporations by the inquisitorial
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powers of the Commission, and with this the judicial branch cannot
rightfully interfere.
5. Before an objection to the evidence can be considered a record
must not only show the offer and refusal thereof but the materiality
of it.--Judgment reversed.
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